being-with animals

While many have agreed to Fox’s claim that “every instance of this [patriarchal] linguistic practice brings us one step closer to an oppressive state,” I think it is important for us to be mindful of the author’s argument and not draw radical conclusions from the author’s observations. The author explicitly argues that “our language necessarily reflects a human-centered viewpoint more completely than a male-centered one” (589). The crucial verb in this sentence is ‘reflects’, implying that language is merely reflexive of preexisting social beliefs instead of actively producing the hierarchies that we are concerned with. Rather than these hierarchies being propagated through the language we use itself, instead they are the result of deeply invested mentalities and cultural beliefs that our language is merely symbolic of. I believe that Foucault is correct in noting that it is “necessary also to distinguish power relations from relationships of communication that transmit information by means of a language, a system of signs, or any other symbolic medium.” Just because “the production and circulation of elements of meaning can have as their objective or as their consequence certain results in the realm of power; the latter are not simply an aspect of the former” (Foucault 337). Wendy Brown implicates this by arguing that “moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and cultural formations of power” (Brown 30). By oversimplifying the problem of speciesism and patriarchy to mere rhetoric, we run the risk of trading off with genuine political progress. Moreover, this also implies that words have no authentic meaning. Foucault frequently writes of the ability to strategically reverse many power relations that exist, and I believe that the treatment of the word ‘foxy’ is an example of this. The example of the word “foxy” is given by the literature, with the author noting “the ambivalence of foxy lady. A man who labels a woman “foxy” admires her as stylish and attractive yet sees her largely as a sex object worth possessing” (588). This is not to say that words such as ‘bitch’ and other overtly derogatory terminology can ever have a positive connotation (although Lil Kim might beg to differ). However, I think that we need to be mindful of the mentality that shapes the language that we use instead of being asphyxiated with the language itself.

I found the inclusion of Alice in Wonderland in Derrida’s analysis on speciesism to be fascinating. The excerpts in the anthology were confusing to say the least. Derrida argues that it is impossible to presuppose certain relationships with animals “for I no longer know who I am (following) or who it is I am chasing, who is following me or hunting me” (598). Derrida approaches a reconfiguration with animals through a problematization of the Self. I think that Derrida is correct in focusing on a deeper interrogation. Contrary to the belief that Cartesian dualism is the cause of the exploitation of animals, Derrida believes that we need to look at something more intrinsic to the development of humans. Many argue that “Descartes internalized, within man, the dualism implicit in the human relation to animals. In dividing absolutely body from soul, he bequeathed the body to the laws of physics and mechanics, and, since animals were soulless, the animal was reduced to the model of a machine” (605). Derrida seeks to look past this arbitrary rise of speciesism and acknowledge that speciesism was likely borne out of pre-Enlightenment practices. Most confusing from the Derrida passage is his use of the famed Alice quotation regarding madness, “We’re all mad here. I’m mad. You’re mad” (598). Out of context, it is pretty confusing to see how this is remotely relevant to Derrida’s argument. However, further reading of The Animal That Therefore I Am contextualizes this more. Derrida is attempting to undermine previous relations with animals in order to develop a new relationship with the Other. Derrida speaks from the “point of view of the absolute other, and nothing will have ever done more to make me think through this absolute alterity of the neighbor” (Derrida). After declaring one’s own madness, “I no longer know how to respond, or even to respond to the question that compels me or asks me who I am (following) or after whom I am (following), but am so as I am running” (Derrida). In doing so, Derrida is developing a new mode of Being with animals. Specifically, that is “Being after, being alongside, being near [pres] would appear as different modes of being, indeed of being-with. With the animal” (Derrida). While I admit, the Madness claims are still relatively abstract in this context, Derrida makes a little more sense. The declaration of one’s own Madness functions to dissolve the boundaries between animals and humans in order to develop a different mode of being-with animals. It is only through reconfiguring these relationships (as opposed to mere rhetoric) can hierarchies be challenged.

derrida

Wendy Brown. Politics Out Of History. Princeton University Press (2001): 30.

Jacques Derrida. The Animal That Therefore I Am. Fordham University Press (2008).

Michel Foucault. “The Subject and Power”. Power: Essential Works of Foucault Vol. 2. Ed. Colin Gordon.