sadism

It’s somewhat difficult to draw the correct implication from the Stanford prison experiment. It is safe to say that the experiments reflect an inherent tendency in human nature, considering the experiment was conducted in a “mock prison in the basement of the Stanford psychology building” (486). Rather than being an examination of actual legal institutions, the experiment was merely a simulation of the different interpersonal relationships that many individuals have. The study concluded with the determination that “both prisoners and guards had become too grossly absorbed in their roles and terminated the experiment after six days” (486). This was due to the sadistic tendencies that many guards exhibited in their treatment of prisoners. It seems implied in the summary’s account of the experiment that the sadistic responses were the result of an inherent aspect of human nature that takes advantage of other human beings. The comparison to Abu Ghraib is particularly compelling, with the conductor of the Stanford experiment describing it as the result of “systemic problems of a formally established military incarceration system” (488). It is this comparison that I think makes the original Stanford experiment particularly useful. This is in line with analysis of Abu Ghraib provided by the social sciences, considering “Lynndie England was dubbed the ‘Trailer trash torturer,’ by British tabloids, while a reporter from the Daily Telegraph wrote that Americans were being shamed by ‘smirking jezebels from the Appalachians”” (Cowen). This discourse functioned as a “means of individualizing blame for US imperial violence, placing it at the feet of young rural soldiers” (Cowen). Only through recognizing that institutional roles have a tendency to create violence and abuse can we confront the types of roles that people play that could encourage them to exploit.

abu ghraib photos

Similar lessons can be learned from Hogarth’s “The Four Stages of Cruelty.” In this story, the killing of an animal initiated by boys is attributed to the “absence of parish officers,” implying that “one of the causes for the rising crime rate was the lack of care from the overseers of the poor, who were too often interested in the posts only for the social status and monetary rewards they could bring” (490). In some ways, this locates animal abuse as an institutional instead of personal problem. Just as the ultimate lesson of Abu Ghraib and the Stanford prison experiment was that certain institutional arrangements are uniquely conducive to exploitation and hierarchies, Hogarth uses emotional images to “heighten the fear for the audience” for the purpose of advocating certain political changes. The assigned reading even notes certain changes in common law as the result of the influence of Hogarth. The types of empathic connections established by Hogarth have also been supported by physical evidence. For example, many “brain-imaging studies have begun to reveal the physical evidence of empathy’s erosion” (501). This suggests that the belief that animal abuse is a natural human condition is relatively untrue, considering the brain has specific neurological pathways designed for empathy. The compassionate thoughts elicited by Hogarth’s writings can alter social consciousness, since the “mere act of thinking compassionate thoughts caused significant activity and physical changes in the brain’s empathic pathways” (501). Rather than resist the difficult nature of confronting the suffering of others, perhaps this can be a productive approach.

we must actively confront animal abuse

Deborah Cowen. “National Soldiers and the War on Cities.” Theory & event. 10.2: 2007.